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Abstract: Can voluntary disclosure be used to enhance insiders’ strategic trade while providing legal
cover? We investigate this question in the context of 10b5-1 trading plans. Prior literature suggests that
insiders lose strategic trade value if their planned trades are disclosed. But disclosure might enhance
strategic trade because courts can only consider publicly available evidence from defendants at the motion
to dismiss phase of trial. This practice can enhance legal protection for firms that disclose planned trades,
especially those disclosing detailed information. Consistent with increased legal protection, we find that
voluntary disclosure of planned trades increases with firm litigation risk and potential gains to insiders’
trades. We also find that insider sales and abnormal returns are higher for disclosed plans, especially those
that articulate specific plan details. This suggests that voluntary disclosure, which is conventionally
thought to reduce information asymmetries, can create legal cover for opportunistic insider trading.
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1.

Introduction
Ever since Louis Brandeis (1933) wrote “[s]unlight is the best of disinfectants,” disclosure has

been assumed to be a mechanism for reducing the opportunities for strategic trade behavior by insiders
who possess private information about a firm. Although disclosure has direct and indirect costs, the
prevailing literature assumes disclosure reduces information asymmetries and is therefore good for
uninformed market participants. Finance and accounting theory suggests that corporate insiders do not
have incentives to disclose pending trades in advance of trading in their own firm’s stock (e.g., Baiman
and Verrecchia, 1996). Advance disclosure reveals insiders’ private information about the expected value
of the stock price (e.g, Admati and Pfleiderer, 1991; Khan and Lu, 2011), and this can induce investor
front-running, i.e., selling before insiders in anticipation of their sales. Either of these have the potential
effect of lowering share prices before insiders’ sales execute.1 Accordingly, prior theoretical research
predicts there would be no voluntary disclosure of private information before insiders trade.
We propose that this theory does not fully consider how legal rules can shape firms’ disclosure
incentives, and significantly alter insiders’ trading incentives. For instance, voluntary disclosure not only
provides information to potential counterparties but, given the process dictated by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, also provides incremental litigation risk reduction. We show this litigation risk reduction
arising from disclosure of insiders’ trading plans creates opportunities for insiders to enhance their profits
from trading.
We use an exogenous rule change regarding the legal effect of insiders’ commitment to trade in
the future, found in Rule 10b5-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as a mechanism to test the
impact of voluntarily disclosed trading plans on insiders’ strategic trade potential. Rule 10b5-1 was
promulgated in October 2000 to better allow insiders to diversify firm-specific holdings by providing an
affirmative legal defense for trades that are prearranged at a time when insiders attested they did not
possess material, nonpublic information.2 The SEC does not mandate disclosure of information regarding
insiders’ 10b5-1 use, which gives rise to considerable variation in whether and what firms voluntarily
disclose information about their insiders’ 10b5-1 trading plans. As discussed in detail below, the
affirmative defense protection provided by the Rule is most valuable if 10b5-1 trading plans are publicly
disclosed, especially when disclosures provide specific details. We examine whether this incremental
legal protection arising from disclosure creates greater opportunities for insiders to trade strategically.
We first examine whether the incremental legal protection arising from disclosure of Rule 10b5-1
trades motivates firms to voluntarily disclose information regarding insiders’ planned trades to mitigate

1

There is typically more insider sales than purchases on the open market, particularly within Rule 10b5-1. See, e.g.,
Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003) and Jagolinzer (2009).
2
See Jagolinzer (2009) and Veliotis (2010) for a detailed discussion of the regulatory development of Rule 10b5-1.
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litigation risk concerns, and to satisfy the disclosure demands of outside constituents. We find evidence
that the decision to disclose 10b5-1 trading plans is more common for firms with higher overall litigation
risk and with greater potential for strategic trade by insiders (i.e., when firm-specific stock price volatility
is high). This evidence suggests that firms’ decisions to disclose 10b5-1 trading plans are motivated by
concerns over litigation risk from insiders’ trade. In addition, we find evidence that the decision to
disclose is more common for firms with more financially sophisticated boards, larger institutional
ownership, and greater analyst following. This evidence suggests that boards with greater financial
expertise better understand the benefits arising from the disclosure of 10b5-1 trading plans, and that firm
outsiders demand information about 10b5-1 trading plans.
We then examine whether the incremental legal protection arising from disclosure of Rule 10b5-1
trades limits or enhances insiders’ ability to trade strategically. Our tests investigate insiders’ trade and
return patterns, as they are typically considered by courts at the motion-to-dismiss stage of trial to
evaluate claims of scienter. We find evidence that the number of sale transactions by participants rises
dramatically after the disclosure of 10b5-1 plan participation, and increases with disclosure specificity. In
contrast, we do not find evidence of elevated sale transactions by insiders who trade outside of Rule 10b51 plans (hereafter, non-participants). This evidence suggests that participants view disclosure of 10b5-1
plans, especially disclosure of specific plan information, as providing significant legal benefits. They
trade more freely in these plans in ways that might otherwise give rise to greater legal liability.
Using abnormal return patterns as another benchmark regarding informed trade, we find that the
returns following insiders’ sales in 10b5-1 trading plans that are voluntarily disclosed are more negative
relative to the returns following insiders’ sales for those inferred to be trading within, but not disclosing,
10b5-1 plans. In addition, we find evidence that insiders’ sales generate the largest abnormal returns when
specific plan details are voluntarily disclosed. This behavior appears fortuitously timed, and suggests that
greater disclosure occurs when there is greater certainty about pending negative performance (i.e., a
strategy of “hiding in plain sight”).
Taken together, our findings provide important new insights regarding firms’ decisions to
voluntarily disclose information to the public. There is little prior research that directly investigates the
link between voluntary disclosure and insider trading, which is surprising given the potential legal
consequences.3 One notable exception is Rogers (2008), who utilizes a sample that predates Rule 10b5-1
and finds that firms voluntarily disclose higher quality financial information prior to insiders’ sales to
3

There is a well-developed literature that examines why firms voluntary disclose financial or firm-performance
information and its association with litigation risk (e.g., Skinner, 1994; Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper, 1994;
Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Skinner, 1997; Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough, 2002; Field, Lowry, and Shu, 2005;
Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2008; Rogers, 2008). However, most of this literature does not consider insider trading
implications. There is also some ambiguity regarding the degree to which voluntary disclosure of financial
information (e.g., management’s earnings forecasts) mitigates litigation risk (Field, Lowry, and Shu, 2005).
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limit their litigation risk. While these findings provide evidence that firms attempt to forego insiders’
strategic trade advantage to limit their litigation risk through the disclosure of private information, they do
not speak to whether litigation-reducing disclosure can actually enhance an insiders’ strategic trade
advantage. Our study provides evidence that it can. This counterintuitive finding arises directly from
courts providing affirmative defense protection in motion to dismiss proceedings only to those plans that
are publicly disclosed. For this reason, disclosure enhances the probability of early case dismissal, which
can therefore provide greater protection for insider trades.
Our findings also provide important new insights regarding the efficacy and consequences of
Rule 10b5-1 by showing that insiders’ ability to engage in strategic trade appears to vary directly with the
extent of disclosure. Jagolinzer (2009) establishes that insiders (identified through voluntary disclosure)
can generate abnormal returns through trading within 10b5-1 plans and that these returns are greater than
those earned by non-participants from the same firm.4 Jagolinzer (2009), however, does not examine why
firms disclose 10b5-1 plans, why there is cross-sectional variation in these disclosures, or what
implications these choices have on insider trading profitability. More evidence regarding how firms and
insiders behave under the Rule should provide useful insights, considering the enormous magnitude of
stock being traded within these plans (e.g., in a single year within our sample, insiders sold $25 billion
worth of shares within these plans). We extend this prior research in two ways. First, our cross-sectional
analysis of firms within 10b5-1 plans provide new insights regarding firms’ decisions to disclose their
plans—i.e., that voluntary disclosure increases with firm litigation risk, insider strategic trade potential,
financial sophistication of the board and voluntary disclosure demands of institutional owners and
financial analysts. Second, and more importantly, our results provide new insights regarding how insiders
are able to exploit the Rule—i.e., through enhanced disclosure.
Section 2 of this study provides background information regarding Rule 10b5-1 and outlines
expectations regarding disclosure choice determinants and implications. Section 3 outlines sample
selection procedures. Section 4 outlines empirical tests and results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2.

Trading Plan Disclosure Choice and Implications

2.1. Disclosure Choice
The decision to disclose information about insiders’ participation in Rule 10b5-1 is a firm-level
(e.g., board of directors) choice. We infer this because disclosure is observed through firm-level
disclosure instruments (e.g., SEC 8-K, Form 4, 10-Q/K filings and press releases) that often require
processing through the firm’s legal, media relations, and or investor relations departments. We also infer
4

Two other studies investigate the effect of adoption of 10b5-1 trading plans on firms’ decisions, but are not
focused directly on insider trading activity. Henderson (2012) observes a shift in executive pay arrangements
following adoption of 10b5-1 trading plans. Shon and Veliotis (2012) observe a higher propensity for firms to meet
or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts at firms that adopt Rule 10b5-1 plans.
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this because we commonly observe multiple insiders from the firm named in a single firm disclosure
document, which seems to indicate that insiders are not individually disclosing their participation. Finally,
we infer this because several corporate attorneys and Rule 10b5-1 plan administrators have anecdotally
conveyed that firms (e.g., boards) determine policy regarding disclosure of these plans. What is not clear,
however, is why firms disclose information about their insiders’ use of 10b5-1 plans or why there is
considerable variation in how much detail is disclosed about insiders’ use of these plans.
Firms likely disclose planned trades (pursuant to Rule 10b5-1) details to reduce legal risk. The
biggest component of this legal risk derives from the potential for securities class action lawsuits. If sued
in a securities class action, firms face potentially large defense and settlement costs.5 These costs do not
increase linearly over time, but rather increase substantially after an initial hearing on the validity of the
plaintiffs’ claims, called a “motion to dismiss” proceeding. Because of the nature of these costs, firms
have strong incentives to “win” a class action case at the motion to dismiss stage. Crucially, courts may
not consider the 10b5-1 affirmative defense at the motion to dismiss phase if the plans are previously
undisclosed. This is because courts cannot consider materials other than the plaintiff’s pleadings when
considering the motion, and defendants are not typically allowed to rebut factual allegations. Courts can,
however, consider publicly available documents that are not a part of the complaint, e.g., taking judicial
notice of already released SEC filings, prospectuses, analysts’ reports, and other publicly reported data. A
publicly disclosed 10b5-1 plan thus has a greater likelihood of influencing a motion to dismiss than a plan
that is not publicly disclosed. Numerous cases stand for this proposition.6
Corporate advisors share this view. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services, the largest
proxy advising firm for institutional shareholders, concludes, “such plans should be filed in some form
with the SEC so that [they] . . . can be considered at the motion to dismiss stage” (White, 2003). Lawyers

5

“[C]ompanies are paying the legal costs of…executives defending themselves against fraud allegations. The
amount of money being paid…totals hundreds of millions, or even billions of dollars. A company’s average cost of
defending against shareholder suits last year was $2.2 million according to Tillinghast-Towers Perrin.” Laurie P.
Cohen, “Adding Insult to Injury: Firms Pay Wrongdoers’ Legal Fees”, The Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2004.
Average firm settlements are approximately $30 million per suit. More than ten suits settled between $300 million
and $6 billion in 2005 alone (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005).
6
See, e.g., Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88-89 (6th Cir.1997) and In re Royal Appliance Sec. Litig., 1995
WL 490131, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug.15, 1995). Precedent cases suggest that disclosure is needed to mount a defense at
the motion to dismiss stage. For example, Fener v. Belo Corp.425 F.Supp.2d 788 (N.D. Tex. 2006) notes that
plaintiffs have an obligation to address in their complaint whether a trading plan was in effect, and if so, “why . . .
this does not undercut a strong inference of scienter.” Friedman v. Rayovac Corp., 291 F. Supp. 2d 845 (WD. Wis.
2003) notes that it would generally not consider the trading plan or any other document appended to the motion to
dismiss, but it would in this case as the plan was “publicly available on the SEC's website and was filed as an exhibit
to numerous reports Rayovac filed with the SEC.” In re Netflix, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 1562858 (N.D. Cal. June
28, 2005) and Weitschner v. Monterey Pasta Company, 2003 WL 22889372, No. C 03-0632 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4,
2003) the courts consider publicly disclosed trading plans at the motion to dismiss stage to find no strong inference
of scienter. S.E.C. v. Healthsouth Corp., 261 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1322-3 (N.D.Ala., 2003) notes the existence and
disclosure of a trading plan to rebut the SEC’s allegations of the requisite scienter for securities fraud.
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advising firms on securities fraud litigation matters also think disclosure is a prerequisite to risk
reduction: “[t]he adoption of the Rule 10b5-1 trading plans . . . should be publicly disclosed” to reduce
the risk of litigation (Roberts and Porritt, 2004; Siegel and Lenahan, 2002). In short, while undisclosed
10b5-1 plans provide some risk reduction in the event the case goes to trial, disclosure can further
enhance legal protection by increasing the likelihood of early dismissal for securities class action suits.
One other detail about trial procedure is relevant to the disclosure decision. Because the motion to
dismiss stage consists of a preliminary look at the merits of the case, the degree of detail disclosed
regarding insiders’ Rule 10b5-1 plans likely impacts the probability of dismissal. If only the existence of
a plan is disclosed, a court may not have sufficient information at this stage of litigation to ascertain
whether the insider sufficiently complied with the Rule and whether the allegedly fraudulent trades are
covered by the plan. If the full details about planned trades (e.g., dates, amounts, or prices) are disclosed,
however, a court may better ascertain whether the allegedly fraudulent trades fall within the Rule’s
affirmative defense, thereby increasing the probability of a low-cost dismissal. A recent decision by the
First Circuit reaches exactly this result and thus highlights the importance of making specific disclosures.7
The preceding discussion suggests that firms likely obtain litigation benefits from Rule 10b5-1
plan disclosures, and that the benefits are increasing in the specificity of the public disclosures. If so, then
one would expect firms with greater ex ante litigation risk to be more apt to disclose the existence and
details of Rule 10b5-1 plans. Litigation risk can be measured both in terms of the firm’s propensity for
general class action risk and in terms of insiders’ strategic trade potential.8
While there are clear legal risk reduction benefits from public disclosure, it may increase costs for
insiders if investors can infer insiders’ strategic intent from disclosure (Rogers, 2008) or if disclosure
enhances investors’ monitoring of insiders’ trade plan commitment. Specifically, if the act of disclosure
causes investors to infer strategic intent by insiders then disclosure can induce investor front-running, i.e.,
selling before the insiders, (e.g., Khan and Lu, 2011) or information acquisition that can reveal insiders’
private information (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1991) and effectively lower price before insiders’ trades
execute. Accordingly, firms’ insiders may prefer non-disclosure when litigation risk is low, as insiders’
front running costs can outweigh the incremental legal protection afforded by disclosure and firms likely
bear the costs of making insiders “whole”. Interviews and comment letters regarding proposed mandatory
7

Miss. Pub. Employ. Retire. Sys. v. Boston Scientific Corp., __ F.3d. __, 2008 WL 1735390 (1st Cir. Apr. 16, 2008)
(reversing grant of motion to dismiss because trial court inappropriately considered undisclosed 10b5-1 trading plan
at the motion to dismiss phase).
8
In models of insiders’ strategic trade (e.g., Huddart and Ke, 2007), insiders’ information advantage is determined
by prior stock price variance and the precision of insiders’ private information. Low investor uncertainty—i.e., low
prior stock price variance—provides little scope for profitable insider trade, even if the insider possesses perfect
private information. For a given level of private information, then, insiders’ strategic trade potential is increasing in
prior stock price variance. Insiders’ strategic trade potential is also increasing in insiders’ private information about
pending performance. This construct, however, is not observable.
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disclosure indicate that front-running concerns factor into the decision to not disclose or to disclose little
detail regarding 10b5-1 participation: “We do not believe the establishment, modification, or termination
of Rule 10b5-1 arrangements should be reported. …[R]equiring disclosure of the mere presence of these
plans would attribute meaning where none may exist” (Cleary, Gottleib, Steen & Hamilton, 2002).
Relatedly, if disclosure provides investors with insiders’ 10b5-1 plan details, then it allows for ex
post reconciliation of plan commitment. As discussed below, Rule 10b5-1 creates a valuable real option
by allowing insiders to selectively terminate plans even when they possess material, nonpublic
information. If plans are not disclosed, the option’s cost is zero. Disclosure, however, raises the cost of
the option by allowing outsiders to reconcile data reported in insiders’ transaction reports with details
provided with 10b5-1 disclosures.9 Reconciliation could reveal insiders’ use of the strategic early plan
termination option, potentially increasing regulatory scrutiny of insiders’ good faith compliance with the
Rule.10 Therefore, greater disclosure reduces insiders’ value of the early termination option. Ceteris
paribus, insiders should generally prefer no disclosure.
Outside shareholders might infer 10b5-1 disclosure benefits if disclosure provides for better
monitoring of or greater insider commitment to disclosed trade plans. In addition, firms with greater
demands for voluntary disclosure from other outsiders (e.g., financial analysts) might benefit more by
providing more disclosure to meet these demands. Finally, larger and more financially sophisticated
boards might better understand the legal benefits of disclosing 10b5-1 plans. Therefore, there is likely a
positive relationship between the probability of firm disclosure and outside demand for information and
also the size and financial sophistication of the board.
2.2. Disclosure Implications for Strategic Trade
To understand the potential effect of disclosure on strategic trade, it is helpful to consider the type
of information an insider might have at 10b5-1 plan initiation and the likelihood that an insider might
obtain valuable private information over the duration of her trading plan. Consider, for example, an
insider who possesses some information at plan initiation but does not expect to obtain highly valuable
information over the duration of her plan (e.g., if the firm exhibits low volatility). This insider may be less
concerned with potential trade-based litigation risk because the nature of her information is less likely to
generate legal scrutiny and she already obtains some litigation protection from entering a 10b5-1 plan
even if it is not disclosed. If the firm discloses information about her plan, this insider may be concerned
that she will lose her modest information advantage (e.g., if the market falsely infers that she is privately

9

Insiders are required to file a report with the SEC – Form 4 – within two days of all trades.
The SEC states that “[t]ermination of a plan, or the cancellation of one or more plan transactions, could affect the
availability of the Rule 10b5-1(c) defense for prior plan transactions [SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Manual
of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations, Fourth Supplement, Rule 10b5-1, Question 15(b) (issued May
2001)].”
10
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informed and adjusts price downward before her trades execute). If this were the case, then this particular
insider would prefer non-disclosure.11 If this setting describes the case for non-disclosure of plans then
non-disclosed 10b5-1 sale transactions are less likely to be associated with patterns of strategic trade.
Consider next an insider who does not possess valuable information at plan initiation (or who
may possess valuable information with high uncertainty) and who expects to obtain valuable information
(e.g., an updated signal regarding his/her initial information) over the duration of his/her plan. This
insider may establish a 10b5-1 sales plan in anticipation of a potential bad outcome yet want the option to
terminate the plan if an updated signal subsequently indicates the bad outcome will not materialize.
Because this strategy would ex post reveal a suspicious trade pattern if the bad outcome does materialize,
the insider would likely value some incremental legal benefit from disclosure. And because a key element
to this strategy is preserving the termination option, this insider would not prefer for the firm to disclose
specific details about his/her 10b5-1 plan. The insider would prefer for the firm to only disclose limited
detail, as this provides some incremental litigation risk reduction and yet preserves the termination option
at relatively low cost.12 If this setting describes the limited disclosure group of trades, then trade patterns
would be consistent with ex ante uncertainty and subsequent early termination.13 Early termination would
remove sales that would otherwise be non-profitable, so sales that are retained likely reveal modest
patterns of strategic trade.
Finally, consider an insider who possesses valuable negative (and reasonably certain) information
at plan initiation.14 This insider may establish a 10b5-1 sales plan in anticipation of a reasonably certain
bad outcome. Because the probability of the bad outcome is high, the insider does not expect to execute
the termination option (as it is unlikely that a subsequent updating signal will indicate the bad outcome
will not materialize). This strategy would ex post reveal a suspicious trade pattern when the bad outcome
materializes (and this strategy is expressly forbidden by Rule 10b5-1), so the insider would likely value
the incremental legal benefit from specific disclosure. And because the insider does not value the early
termination option, he/she is willing to forego the option in lieu of enhanced legal protection by providing
specific details regarding his/her trade plan. If this setting describes a specific disclosure group of trades,
then trade patterns would be consistent with ex ante certainty regarding pending negative performance.
11

Any price response may only last for a short duration if market participants subsequently realize that insiders are
acting in good faith. However, trading activity typically increases materially after the first disclosure of 10b5-1
trading plan information (see Figure 1). Therefore, participants likely still prefer non-disclosure because it avoids
the potential that the earliest trades of each new disclosed plan would be less profitable.
12
Because limited disclosure does not provide sufficient plan detail, one cannot infer, ex post, whether an absence of
trade results from early termination, non-execution due to failure to meet limit orders, or natural plan termination.
13
Insiders’ choice to terminate 10b5-1 plans is not observable unless it is voluntarily disclosed (a rare event).
Therefore, we are not able to examine directly whether limited disclosures are characterized by this specific strategy.
14
It seems unlikely that an insider would strategically plan 10b5-1 sales if she possessed reasonably certain positive
information at plan initiation.
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Therefore, sales that are executed within specifically disclosed plans should reveal strong patterns of
strategic trade.
If disclosure is associated with insiders’ potential for strategic trade, then disclosure may provide
a price relevant signal to investors. Investors might respond negatively to limited disclosures regarding
10b5-1 participation, for example, if they infer that insiders have some strategic trade potential for which
they seek litigation protection. Similarly, investors might respond negatively to specific disclosures
regarding 10b5-1 participation, if they infer that insiders have high strategic trade potential for which they
seek the utmost litigation protection. Investors’ response to disclosure will also likely vary with the
degree to which insiders have access to private information (e.g., insider rank), and with expectations for
insiders’ trading activity within the plans. Limited reactions to disclosure of plan participation can occur,
however, if there are frictions to adjusting price conditional on these disclosures or if the market is unable
to fully understand the implications of these disclosures.15
3.

Sample Selection Procedures
The sample of participation disclosures are collected from keyword searches for variants of the

expression “10b5-1” through 8-K filings, business wire reports, and press releases between October 2000
and December 2006. This keyword search nets 773 firm observations. Additional disclosure observations
are collected from keyword searches for variants of the expression “10b5-1” through SEC Form 4 filings
between October 2000 and December 2006.16 This keyword search nets an additional 894 firm
observations. Estimation samples are further constrained by the availability of price and returns data from
CRSP, insider transaction data from Thomson Financial, institutional ownership data from
CDA/Spectrum, governance data from Equilar, management forecasts of earnings from First Call
Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database, and earnings performance data from Compustat.
Sample disclosures of 10b5-1 plan participation are categorized by each author into limited or
specific partitions. The disclosure is classified as specific if it delineates the specific terms underlying the
plan: transaction date(s), transaction volume(s), plan duration, and limit order price (if one exists). Panel
A of the Appendix provides one example of a disclosure that is classified as specific. If the disclosure

15

Several frictions are plausible. First, during the period of this study, Rule 10b5-1 was relatively new, and some
time lag may have been necessary for learning, because the data necessary to draw any conclusions would have only
been sufficient after a few years. This is especially the case for the “specific” disclosure group, which has fewer than
100 observations over the entire period. Also, investment in the research necessary to identify this anomaly might
not have been cost effective. Finally, any investment strategy to capitalize on the anomaly would have required
holding short positions for 6 months or more, which increases investment risk.
16
The SEC mandated electronic Form 4 filings as of June 30, 2003. Unlike previously reported paper filings (which
are available electronically as image scans), the electronic filings enable global keyword searches. As a result, a
substantive proportion of the Form 4-generated sample comes from the period subsequent to June 2003.
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does not delineate the specific terms underlying the plan, the disclosure is categorized as limited.17 Panel
B of the Appendix provides one example of a disclosure that is classified as limited. All Form 4
disclosures are classified as limited as they generally state that a particular transaction is Rule 10b5-1
compliant, yet provide no specific details regarding the underlying plan.18 This classification procedure
yields 94 specific and 1,573 limited firm observations that are further constrained for estimation by data
availability.19
Some analyses require identifying a sample of firms where insiders’ participation in Rule 10b5-1
is not disclosed.20 The non-disclosure sample is inferred from firms where there is no Rule 10b5-1
participation disclosure, where insiders execute sale transactions within thirty-calendar-day periods that
precede quarterly earnings announcements, and where the firm does not appear to have previously
allowed trades to execute in short windows before earnings announcements.21 This inference relies on the
assumption that most firms generally blackout insiders’ trades before earnings announcements, yet allow
Rule 10b5-1 transactions to bypass blackout restrictions.
At least two errors can occur from the non-disclosure sample inference algorithm. The first error
occurs if the non-disclosure sample inadvertently excludes participating firms whose insiders’
transactions do not execute shortly before earnings (Type II error). We estimate that our algorithm results
in a relatively low false negative error rate of 30% when applied to disclosing firms—where plan
participation is known. If trading outside of pre-earnings windows is typically less strategic (Jagolinzer,
17

Heterogeneity in disclosure specificity exists within the limited disclosure category. However, attempts to further
partition limited disclosures along specificity dimensions are inherently ad hoc, because it is unclear, for example,
whether a disclosure that provides details about the maximum shares tradable within a plan is more or less specific
than a disclosure that provides details about the approximate timing of transactions within the plan (e.g., “shares
will be traded monthly”). Therefore, our tests do not rely on specificity classifications within the limited group.
While this choice results in isolating a relatively small set of firms in the specific category, it provides a clean
delineation between specific and limited disclosure firms, which enhances the power and interpretability of our tests.
18
Form 4 disclosures may provide different inferences than other participation disclosures as they follow trades
made within 10b5-1 plans. Form 4 disclosures are similar to other limited disclosures, however, in that they convey
that an insider has initiated a plan and that the insider is likely to execute further trade within the plan.
19
Using a random sample of 100 limited disclosure firms and all of the specific disclosure firms, we find that the
decision to disclose 10b5-1 trading plan is “sticky.” Specifically, in untabulated tests, we find during the year
(second year) following the first full year after initial disclosure that 35% (35%) of limited disclosure firms continue
to provide limited disclosures through 8-K filings, business wire reports, press releases or Form 4 filings, and that
19% (14%) move to providing specific disclosures. In addition, during the year (second year) following the first full
year after initial disclosure that 19% (14%) of specific disclosure firms continue to provide specific disclosures
through 8-K filings, business wire reports or press releases, and that 30% (43%) move to providing only limited
disclosures.
20
Jagolinzer (2009) corroborates the existence of firms that choose to not disclose 10b5-1 plan participation,
through a survey of nearly 2,700 Nasdaq firms. Nearly 18% of the 378 respondent firms report that they had at least
one insider participate within Rule 10b5-1 between October 2000 and December 2002, yet the firm chose to not
disclose this information.
21
Specifically, firms are excluded if insider trades are observed in pre-earnings windows during the year that
precedes Rule 10b5-1 promulgation. Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) show that fewer than 15% of sample firms
authorize insiders’ trades in the 30 days that precede earnings announcements.
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Larcker, and Taylor 2011), then false negative error should bias towards documenting an association
between non-disclosure and strategic trade.
The second error occurs if the non-disclosure sample inadvertently includes non-participating
firms whose insiders’ transactions execute shortly before earnings for reasons other than 10b5-1 plan
execution (Type I error). We estimate that our algorithm results in a relatively low false positive error rate
of 14% when applied to firms surveyed by Jagolinzer (2009) for their participation in 10b5-1 trading
plans.22 If trading within pre-earnings windows under general counsel approval is typically less strategic
(Jagolinzer, Larcker, and Taylor 2011), then false positive error should bias against documenting an
association between non-disclosure and strategic trade. Note that any misclassifications resulting from the
use of this algorithm only relate to comparisons involving the non-disclosure subsample—i.e.,
comparisons of limited versus specific disclosure subsamples are not affected.23
Firms across disclosure specificity groups appear generally similar in size and performance, and
are modestly larger and more profitable than the general Compustat population during the estimation
period. For example, the median market value of equity (untabulated) is $625, $745, $603, and $163
million and return on assets is 3%, 4%, 1.3%, and 1.4% for the non-disclosure, limited-disclosure,
specific-disclosure, and Compustat population samples, respectively.
4.

Empirical Analyses

4.1. Disclosure Choice
Because we are generally interested in understanding the relation between voluntary disclosure,
litigation risk, and insiders’ strategic trade, our first empirical analysis investigates whether the voluntary
disclosure of 10b5-1 plan participation is more prevalent for firms with high litigation risk, high potential
for insiders’ strategic trade, board governance, and high demand by outside constituents. We investigate
firms’ first decisions to disclose participation within Rule 10b5-1 trading plans using the following
logistic regression model:
Pr(Discl=1) = a0 + a1LitRisk + a2Volat + a3InstitOwn + a4LnNumDirs + a5FinExpertDirs
+ a6InsideDirs + a7LnAnalystFollow + a8MgmtFcst + a9LnMVE + e
22

(1)

Sixty-eight of the firms from the Jagolinzer (2009) survey (discussed earlier) stated that they did not disclose the
existence of 10b5-1 plans during the period from October 2000 through December 2002. When we estimate our
algorithm (i.e., look for the existence of insiders’ sales in short windows before earnings announcements) for all
firms during this time period, we yield a sample of 79 inferred non-disclosure firms. Eleven of the 79 firms (14%)
are false positive observations.
23
We investigate the sensitivity of our findings to possible classification errors for undisclosed plans. Specifically,
we randomly replaced 14% of our non-disclosure observations with trades drawn from the population of non-10b51. Our inferences remain unchanged in these (untabulated) tests. We considered an alternative algorithm to identify
non-disclosed 10b5-1 trades by looking for patterns of systematic trade execution through time (e.g., at regular
monthly intervals). However, we chose not to pursue this alternative algorithm because it seems less direct than our
current algorithm and it would likely induce bias in our tests due to systematic trade patterns being uninformed
(Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski, 2012).
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where Discl is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm discloses Rule 10b5-1 participation
details, and zero otherwise; LitRisk is the firm’s expected class action litigation probability estimated in
the year prior to 10b5-1 participation disclosure (estimated using annual cross-sectional logistic
regressions following Rogers and Stocken, 2005); Volat is the standard deviation of residuals from a
regression of firm daily returns on the daily returns to the value-weighted CRSP portfolio in the year prior
to disclosure (CRSP); InstitOwn is the percentage of institutional firm ownership measured in the year
prior to disclosure (CDA/Spectrum); LnNumDirs is the natural log of one plus the number of directors on
the board in the year prior to disclosure (Equilar and hand collected); FinExpertDirs is the ratio of
financial experts to total board directors in the year prior to disclosure (Corporate Library); InsideDirs is
the ratio of officer directors to total board directors in the year prior to disclosure (Equilar);
LnAnalystFollow is the natural log of one plus the number of unique analysts providing forecasts for the
firm measured in the year prior to disclosure (I/B/E/S); MgmtFcst is a dichotomous variable that equals
one if the firm issues at least one management earnings forecast during the period and equals zero
otherwise (First Call); and LnMVE is the natural log of market value of equity in the year prior to
disclosure (Compustat).
If firms expect the net benefit from disclosure to be increasing in the expected general litigation
risk of class action suits then the coefficient for LitRisk should be positive. If firms expect higher
litigation risk benefits when insiders’ strategic trade potential is greater (which likely increases overall
litigation risk relative to LitRisk as insiders have better opportunities to profit from private information),
then the coefficient for Volat should be positive. If large outside investors expect monitoring, plan
commitment, litigation, or information signaling benefits from disclosure then the coefficient for
InstitOwn should be positive. If larger boards and more financially sophisticated boards better understand
the benefits of the disclosure of 10b5-1 trading plans then the coefficients for LnNumDirs and
FinExpertDirs should be positive. Alternatively, if larger boards are less effective monitors of insiders’
activities (e.g., Yermack, 1996) then the coefficient for LnNumDirs should be negative. If insiders expect
front-running or plan commitment costs from disclosure then the coefficient for InsideDirs should be
negative. If firms with greater demands for voluntary disclosure are more likely to disclose 10b5-1 plan
details, then the coefficients for LnAnalystFollow, MgmtFcst and LnMVE should be positive.
Equation (1) is estimated using disclosure observations, both specific and limited, where the
fiscal year is the first year in which disclosure is observed between 2001 and 2006, and non-disclosure
observations where the fiscal year is the first year in which inferred Rule 10b5-1 participation is observed
between 2001 and 2006 and no disclosure is made. We estimate equation (1) using two specifications.
The first is a logistic regression that includes all firm-year observations, which compares the disclosure
firms in the initial plan adoption year against all non-disclosure firm years. The second is an ordered
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logistic regression, which is similar to the logistic regression specification but allows the disclosure level
to vary for limited and specific disclosure firms. We include industry and year fixed effects to control for
prevailing industry and market conditions.
The two panels of Table 1 report descriptive statistics for the determinants of voluntary disclosure
of 10b5-1 participation, with comparisons across disclosure groups. Panel B reports univariate statistics
within disclosure groups and provides evidence that voluntary disclosure of plan participation is more
common for high litigation risk firms. Specifically, average LitRisk is relatively greater for both the
specific and limited firms than for the non-disclosure firms (difference = 0.009 and 0.007, t-statistics =
4.22 and 10.67, respectively). Panel B also provides evidence that voluntary disclosure of plan
participation is more common for firms with greater stock price volatility, greater institutional ownership,
smaller boards, more sophisticated boards, less insider dominated boards, greater analyst following,
greater voluntary disclosure of management earnings guidance, and of smaller size. Specifically, average
Volat is relatively greater for both the specific and limited firms than for the non-disclosure firms
(difference = 0.012 and 0.003, t-statistics = 5.62 and 5.13, respectively). In addition, average Volat is
relatively greater for the specific firms than the limited firms (difference = 0.009, t-statistic = 4.07).
Average InstitOwn is relatively greater for the limited firms than for the non-disclosure firms (difference
= 0.077, t-statistic = 7.83). Average LnNumDirs is relatively lower for the specific and limited firms than
for the non-disclosure firms (difference = -1.223 and -0.805, t-statistics = -2.66 and -6.85, respectively).
Average FinExpertDirs is relatively greater for the specific and limited firms than for the non-disclosure
firms (difference = 0.054 and 0.089, t-statistics = 1.82 and 11.03, respectively). Average InsideDirs is
relatively lower for the limited firms than the non-disclosure firms (difference = -0.012, t-statistic = 1.91). Average AnalystFollow is relatively greater for the limited firms than the non-disclosure firms
(difference = 1.322, t-statistic = 3.87). Average MgmtFcst is relatively greater for both the specific and
limited firms than for the non-disclosure firms (difference = 0.142 and 0.140, t-statistics = 2.10 and 7.64,
respectively). Average MVE is relatively lower for the limited firms than for the non-disclosure firms
(difference = -1,639.521, t-statistic = -1.89).
The logistic and ordered logistic estimation results are presented in Table 2. We report both
coefficient estimates and estimates of average marginal effects. Consistent with evidence reported in
Panel B of Table 1, the results indicate that higher class action litigation risk firms are associated with
greater disclosure probability of 10b5-1 plan participation (LitRisk Coeffs. = 6.498 and 5.152; z-statistics
= 2.34 and 1.94).24 The results also indicate that firms with higher insider strategic trade potential (i.e.,
24

Results are similar when LitRisk is replaced with an alternative litigation risk proxy, Lawsuit, which is a
dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm entered a class action lawsuit damage period in the year preceding
disclosure and that equals zero otherwise. Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) suggest that firms consider recent
lawsuits as salient to determining disclosure policy.
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higher risk that insiders can exploit information when trading within 10b5-1 plans) are more likely to
disclose 10b5-1 plan participation (Volat Coeffs. = 24.661 and 25.501; z-statistics = 5.84 and 6.74). This
suggests that firms with higher litigation risk expect benefits from disclosure. In addition, the results
indicate that firms with more financially sophisticated boards (FinExpertDirs Coeffs. = 0.543 and 0.517;
z-statistics = 2.48 and 2.41) are more likely to disclose 10b5-1 plan participation. This suggests that more
financially sophisticated boards better understand the legal protection provided to insiders’ trade through
the disclosure of 10b5-1 trading plans. Finally, the results indicate that firms with higher institutional
ownership (InstitOwn Coeffs. = 0.735 and 0.707; z-statistics = 3.27 and 3.23) and firms with higher
analyst following (LnAnalystFollow Coeffs = 0.275 and 0.268; z-statistics = 4.24 and 4.22) are more
likely to disclose 10b5-1 plan participation. This suggests that institutional investors and analysts may
infer disclosure-related information asymmetry, monitoring, plan commitment, or legal protection
benefits (Bushee and Noe, 2000; Lang and Lundholm, 1996).
4.2. Evidence of Strategic Trade
The next analyses investigate whether there is a link between the incremental legal protection
arising from disclosure and insiders’ strategic trade. These analyses are commonly considered by courts
to assess whether sales by insiders provide circumstantial evidence of scienter in the motion to dismiss
stage. Specifically, we investigate whether insiders’ trading activity is greater than expected (based on
historical trade patterns) within 10b5-1 plans and we also investigate whether insiders’ sales within 10b51 plans tend to precede negative return realizations.
4.2.1. Insider Trading Activity
A. Univariate Analysis
Courts might consider trade activity by insiders to be strategic if it seems materially larger than
the insiders’ prior trading history. Figure 1 plots the average number of trades per insider surrounding the
disclosure of insiders’ participation in 10b5-1 trading plans. Because the typical plan length is 12 months,
our analysis focuses on the 12 months after disclosure, with month 0 being the month of first disclosure.
Stock transactions include both insiders’ sales and purchases; however, the transactions are almost
exclusively insider sales. For non-disclosure firms, a first-pseudo-disclosure date is identified as the
sixtieth calendar day that precedes the first observed within-blackout-window transaction. Because the
typical disclosure happens within a month (rather than at the beginning or end of a month), month 0
includes trades before and after the actual disclosure during the month.
Figure 1, Panels A, B and C all show that the average number of trades per insider increases
materially following the first disclosure of 10b5-1 trading plan information (or following the first-pseudo-
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disclosure date for non-disclosure firms).25 These trading patterns are consistent with abnormal selling
activity by insiders following disclosure, with the greatest increase in the number of trades occurring in
month 0. The Figure 1 panels also show that the average number of trades per insider is increasing with
disclosure specificity, with the largest increase in the average number of trades per insider making
specific disclosures. In addition, the Figure 1 panels show that the abnormal trading remains elevated for
six to eight months following disclosure, and then returns to a more typical level.
To provide an alternative comparison group that uses a firm as its own control, Figure 2, Panels A
and B present the insider trading patterns for non-participants at firms that have disclosed details about
10b5-1 plans during the same time periods as Figure 1. The panels fail to show a similar increase in
trading activity following disclosure by non-participants. In addition, the panels also fail to show that
trading activity by non-participants is increasing with disclosure specificity.
B. Negative binomial regression analysis
Table 3 formally tests the association between the number of insider transactions and disclosure
specificity for plan participants and compares trading patterns relative to non-participants using the
following negative binomial regression model:
NumTrades = l0 + l1 Lim_Partic + l2 Spc_Partic + l3 Lim_NonPartic
+ l4 Spc_NonPartic + e.

(2)

where Lim designates observations from the limited disclosure sample and Spc designates observations
from the specific disclosure sample. Partic designates observations that are participants in 10b5-1 trading
plans and NonPartic designates observations that are not participants in 10b5-1 trading plans.26 Nondisclosure firm observations are from the inferred non-disclosure sample and are captured by the
intercept. We use a negative binomial regression model rather than ordinary least squares because our
dependent variable is a count measure (e.g., the number of times insider trades occur). We report zstatistics based on standard errors clustered by firm because some firms have multiple insiders trading.
Table 3 indicates that the average number of trades per insider after disclosure is relatively higher
for limited and specific disclosure firms than for non-disclosure firms, but is even higher for specific
disclosure firms. For instance, during the shortest measurement window of 0 to 3 months following
25

The observed spike in the number of trades in Panel C is mechanically linked to how we identify and construct the
non-disclosure sample. Specifically, we identify the non-disclosure sample by isolating insiders who execute sale
transactions within 30 calendar days before quarterly earnings announcements. We then use the sixtieth calendar
day that precedes the first observed pre-earnings trade as a first-pseudo-disclosure date. This method biases towards
observing spikes in trading activity subsequent to the first-pseudo-disclosure date. This issue should not materially
affect our investigation of returns performance following these transactions because it is not clear, ex ante, whether
these transactions should systematically predict a major news event.
26
Some prior studies that investigate the determinants of the number of trades executed by insiders (e.g., Bettis,
Coles, and Lemmon, 2000) include the market-to-book ratio and stock price volatility to control for information
asymmetry between insiders and investors. We exclude these variables because Lim and Spc are intended to capture
such information asymmetry.
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disclosure, limited and specific disclosure insiders trade more than non-disclosure insiders (Lim and Spc
Marginal Effects = 0.323 and 0.8490, z-statistics = 6.69 and 3.67, respectively), but specific disclosure
insiders trade more than limited disclosure insiders (Spc – Lim Marg. Effect = 0.526, z-statistic = 2.30).
Table 3 also indicates that the average number of trades per insider for non-participants from
limited and specific firms is relatively lower than for participants from non-disclosure firms, and
relatively lower than for participants from the same respective firms. For instance, during the window of 0
to 3 months following disclosure, non-participants from limited and specific disclosure firms trade less
than participants from non-disclosure firms (Lim_NonPartic and Spc_NonPartic Marg. Effects = -1.698
and -1.143, z-statistics = -50.23 and -2.88, respectively). In addition, non-participants trade less than
participants from the same limited and specific disclosure firms [(Lim_Partic – Lim_NonPartic) and
(Spc_Partic – Spc_NonPartic) Marg. Effects = -2.021 and -1.992, z-statistics = -41.64 and -5.10,
respectively]. Results during longer measurement windows are similar. Taken together, this evidence
suggest that insiders view participation in and disclosure of 10b5-1 trading plans as providing incremental
legal protection, and that more specific disclosure provides even greater legal protection.
4.2.2. Returns Performance
A. Univariate Analysis
Figure 3 plots the cumulative abnormal return relative to the timing of insiders’ sales that are
executed after the first disclosure of insiders’ participation within the Rule. Returns analyses focus
exclusively on insiders’ sale transactions because sales comprise nearly all transactions executed within
Rule 10b5-1 and there are no specific disclosure observations associated with pending insider purchases.
Specifically, Figure 3 cumulates the market adjusted firm returns (daily firm return – the daily return to
the value-weighted CRSP portfolio) from day – 30 to day + 30 relative to each insider transaction day
(executed on day 0) during the one-year period that follows the insider’s first participation disclosure.27
For non-disclosure firms, a first-pseudo-disclosure date is identified as the sixtieth calendar day that
precedes the first observed within-blackout-window transaction.28,29
Figure 3, Panels A, B, and C all show that 10b5-1 sales trades tend to follow positive marketadjusted returns. These patterns are consistent with some 10b5-1 sales being triggered by limit order

27

For all non-disclosure and most limited disclosure observations, it is not possible to discern the length of 10b5-1
plans. A typical disclosed plan length is 12 months, so we assume that trades made within 12 months following plan
disclosure are pursuant to the Rule. Misclassification of observed trades likely induces noise to our tests.
28
For disclosure firms (excluding Form 4 disclosures), the average number of days between disclosure and the first
observed trade is 53. The median number of days is 17. Results are not sensitive to denoting the first-pseudodisclosure date as the thirtieth calendar day that precedes the first observed within-blackout-window transaction.
29
We do not estimate participant versus non-participant comparisons for our tests of insider trade returns (similar to
Jagolinzer, 2009), because there are too few insiders in the specific disclosure group and there is also considerable
overlap in the timing of trades executed by participants and nonparticipants during our one-month trading windows.
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formulas.30 Panel A also shows that sales trades that follow specific disclosure are associated with
negative market-adjusted returns subsequent to the transaction. Relatedly, Panel B shows that sales trades
that follow limited disclosure are also associated with modest negative market-adjusted returns
subsequent to the transaction. Finally, Panel C shows that sales trades that follow non-disclosure do not
appear to be associated with negative subsequent market-adjusted returns. A comparison of post-trade
returns slopes across Figure 3 panels suggests that the degree to which sale transactions are associated
with negative performance is increasing in Rule 10b5-1 plan disclosure specificity.31
B. Portfolio and Multivariate Analysis
We formally test the association between trade returns and disclosure specificity in Table 4 using
a calendar-month portfolio estimation of monthly returns regressed on factors known to explain monthly
returns (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997). Our approach follows the portfolio estimation method
suggested by Mitchell and Stafford (2000), to control for potential contemporaneous cross-sectional
correlation. Specifically, within each disclosure category, monthly portfolios are formed between January
2001 and July 2007 if a 10b5-1 sales transaction is observed in the preceding calendar month, the
preceding three calendar months, or the preceding six calendar months (e.g., Jaffe, 1974; Mandelker,
1974; Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). Note that less powerful tests are expected the longer the
window an insider sales transaction is observed, due to the disclosure signal of an insider’s sales
transaction losing salience over time (Jaffe, 1974). If at least three firms are available to form a
disclosure-month-portfolio, the following regression is estimated:
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(3)

where Rport is the equally-weighted monthly portfolio return, Rf is the one-month treasury bill rate, Rm is
the value-weighted monthly market return, and SMB, HML, and UMD are the monthly small-minus-big,
high-minus-low, and momentum factors that explain monthly stock returns (Fama and French, 1993;
Carhart, 1997, data from CRSP and from Ken French’s website as provided through WRDS).

30

Several disclosed 10b5-1 plans delineate minimum price floor limits to trigger transactions. Some disclosed plans
also delineate graduated limits that trigger incremental sales volume when higher price thresholds are realized.
Results from simple random walk simulations (not tabulated) show that pre-sales “run-up” returns are biased
upwards as limit order prices are increased.
31
Sen (2008) criticizes univariate results, related to those in Figure 3, that were presented in early working paper
versions that preceded the published Jagolinzer (2009) paper. The results presented in this paper and in Jagolinzer
(2009) are robust to this criticism (e.g., Jagolinzer 2009, footnotes 34 and 37). Jagolinzer (2009) and this paper find
evidence of informed trade when using tests that do not rely on the aggregation techniques criticized by Sen (2008).
Sen (2008) does not utilize the sample derived in Jagolinzer (2009 and prior versions), specifically omitting all Rule
10b5-1 trade plans voluntarily disclosed in proxy statements, press releases and 8-Ks. This reduces his sample by
over 26%, which significantly weakens the power of his tests. Further, the sample selection rule could eliminate the
most strategic trades (i.e., those that are difficult to follow because of the high costs of collecting plan information).
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Consistent with evidence presented in Figure 3, results in the first three columns of Table 4
indicate that more specific 10b5-1 plan disclosures are associated with more negative post-trade abnormal
returns, particularly within the first few months that follow transactions. That is, for the one month
following insiders’ transactions, Table 4 indicates that post-trade abnormal returns are statistically more
negative as disclosure becomes more specific. Formal tests comparing portfolio returns indicate that one
month average post-trade abnormal returns are more negative for the limited-disclosure portfolio relative
to the non-disclosure portfolio (-0.010, t-statistic = -1.86), for the specific-disclosure portfolio relative to
the non-disclosure portfolio (-0.041, t-statistic = -4.08), and for the specific-disclosure portfolio relative to
the limited-disclosure portfolio (-0.031, t-statistic = -3.04). Table 4 also indicates a similar, but not
surprisingly weakened, pattern when examining the average one-month abnormal return when an
insiders’ transaction is observed within the three-month window that precedes the calendar month. Over
this window, average one-month post-trade abnormal returns are statistically more negative for the
limited-disclosure portfolio relative to the non-disclosure portfolio (-0.011, t-statistic = -2.04), for the
specific-disclosure portfolio relative to the non-disclosure portfolio (-0.024, t-statistic = -2.83), and for the
specific-disclosure portfolio relative to the limited-disclosure portfolio (-0.013, t-statistic = -1.62). Table
4 further indicates an even weaker pattern in the average one-month abnormal return when an insiders’
transaction is observed within an expanded six-month window that precedes the calendar month. This can
be seen by the smaller magnitude average one month abnormal returns and the smaller magnitude
differences in returns across disclosure partitions. Finally, because non-Form 4 disclosures of 10b5-1
trading are more proactive than waiting for a transaction and disclosing 10b5-1 participation, we
separately analyze post-trade abnormal returns after excluding Form 4 disclosure firms. Results in the last
three columns of Table 4 are consistent with those examining all trades; however, significance levels are
somewhat lower which may be attributable to examining a reduced sample of trades.
4.2.3.

Earnings and Price Relevant News
To better understand what may economically underlie insiders’ strategic trade, we examine the

association between 10b5-1 transaction timing and forthcoming news events that reveal fundamental
economic information about the firm (e.g., earnings). Untabulated results suggest that the first sales
transaction executed under both limited and specific disclosures are associated with a significant decline
in earnings performance relative to market expectations.
We also find that specific disclosures are associated with subsequent negative news events that
may not be impounded in short-term earnings. For example, approximately 25% of the specific disclosure
sample exhibits a single news event, not related to earnings, for which the three-day market adjusted
return falls between -10% and -75%, within an average 140 calendar days of disclosure. These news
events include exchange-imposed stock trade suspension, drug trial failure, and announcement of the
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intent to acquire another firm. We also find that approximately 33% of the remaining specific disclosure
sample exhibit sustained returns declines (between –20% and –80%), for which there is no obvious
associated information event, during the 180 calendar days that follow disclosure. Collectively, this
evidence suggests that Rule 10b5-1 trades tend to be associated with fundamental firm economic shifts.
4.2.4

Investors’ Response to 10b5-1 Disclosure
The ability of insiders to retain trade profitability subsequent to voluntarily disclosing information

regarding insiders’ pending trades depends, in part, on investors’ inability to fully impound potentially
price relevant information from disclosure. To assess how investors impound these voluntary disclosures,
we estimate three day market-adjusted returns centered on the first firm announcement date regarding
pending 10b5-1 sales plans. We market-adjust returns by subtracting the same period return to the valueweighted CRSP portfolio, and analyze the market response to disclosure as a function of information
detailed in the disclosure. Specifically, we estimate the following regression for the sample of first
participation announcements (excluding all initial announcements made through Form 4 disclosures):
MktAdjRet = f0 + f1 Spc + f2 CEOCB + f3 CFO + f4 LnNumExecs + f5 LnPriorNumTrades + z.

(4)

MktAdjRet is the three day cumulative firm return centered on the announcement date minus the three day
return to the value weighted CRSP portfolio, Spc is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the
disclosure is categorized as specific and equals zero otherwise, CEOCB is a dichotomous variable that
equals one if the disclosure names a Board Chairman or Chief Executive Officer participant and equals
zero otherwise, CFO is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the disclosure names a Chief Financial
Officer participant and equals zero otherwise, LnNumExecs equals the log of one plus the number of
insiders named in the disclosure as participants, and LnPriorNumTrades equals the log of one plus the
cumulative number of insider transaction days in the year that precedes the announcement event.
We observe that the average market adjusted return centered on the announcement date
(untabulated) is not significant (-0.215%; t-statistic = -0.96). For equation (4), we observe (untabulated)
that the announcement of a CEO or Chairman participating in a plan yields a lower average return of 0.8% (t-statistic = -1.69). In addition, investors tend to respond more negatively to participation
announcements when expected trade is greater (LnPriorNumTrades = -0.004; t-statistic = -1.76), with
lower average returns of -1.1% for a one standard deviation increase for the number of trades, i.e., -0.004
* Ln(16.950). Other coefficient estimates are not significant. Collectively, this evidence suggests that
investors infer strategic trade potential from these announcements, but that the reaction is fairly limited.
4.2.5

Sensitivity Analysis for Potential Selection Bias
Disclosure choice could correlate with unobserved factors (e.g., insiders’ control over firm

decisions or access to material information) that can influence observed post-trade returns patterns,
irrespective of disclosure. Accordingly, the possibility exists that we inappropriately attribute observed
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results to disclosure choice when, in fact, they evolve from an unobserved characteristic that are
correlated with disclosure choice. To investigate this possibility, we first assess whether average
abnormal return estimates are sensitive to insiders’ frequency of trade or rank, with the expectation that
returns could be more negative following higher trade frequency and higher-level executive
transactions.32 Because insider trade frequency and rank are measured at the firm-level, we conduct this
analysis using a firm-level calendar-time regression (Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan, 2007), that is similar to a
disaggregated Mitchell and Stafford (2000) portfolio estimation method.33 Following Cheng, Nagar, and
Rajan (2007), we regress firm-level value-weighted CRSP market-adjusted monthly returns on the firm’s
book-to-market ratio, its prior return, its prior volatility, and industry fixed effects. We also include the
number of insiders’ sale transactions during the preceding month and indicator variables that equal one if
the firm’s CEO or CFO traded in the prior month. Standard errors are adjusted through month clustering
(Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2010). Untabulated results show that our results continue to indicate that
abnormal trade returns increase in disclosure specificity after controlling for insider trade frequency and
rank. Specifically, abnormal returns estimates for non-disclosure, limited-disclosure, and specificdisclosure firm months are -0.013 (t-statistic = -3.52), -0.022 (t-statistic = -4.65), and -0.043 (t-statistic = 3.30), respectively. Abnormal returns are statistically more negative for the limited-disclosure portfolio
relative to the non-disclosure portfolio (-0.009, t-statistic = -2.52), for the specific-disclosure portfolio
relative to the non-disclosure portfolio (-0.030, t-statistic = -2.54), and for the specific-disclosure portfolio
relative to the limited-disclosure portfolio (-0.021, t-statistic = -1.73).
In addition, we investigate whether observed returns patterns (and differences across disclosure
partitions) exist for insiders’ trades during the twelve-month period ending a year prior to being identified
as participating in a 10b5-1 plan. If disclosure choice inadvertently proxies for an omitted characteristic
(e.g., insiders’ ability to predict or influence future performance), then presumably patterns should be
consistent through time. Results from estimating equation (3) during the pre-10b5-1 time period
(untabulated) fail to provide evidence of strategic selling behavior for insiders in any of the disclosure
partitions, and fail to provide evidence of trade profitability differences across the disclosure partitions.
This mitigates the likelihood that the observed patterns are induced by self-selection.

32

We also assess whether the relation between average abnormal returns and disclosure specificity is stronger when
insiders’ trade frequency or rank is higher. In untabulated tests, coefficients of interactions between disclosure
specificity and insider trade frequency or rank are insignificant.
33
The firm-level estimation is relatively more powerful than the portfolio method, which relies on aggregation (see
Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan, 2007 for a discussion), and explicitly controls for differences in book to market ratios
across firms, which has been shown to explain insiders’ sales returns (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). The approach
also implicitly controls for firm size (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) because firms in the different disclosure partitions
are of similar size.
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Self-selection could also affect our cross-sectional analysis of the markets' reaction to the
announcement of plan 10b5-1 participation, as the market could ex ante predict which firms and insiders
will disclose 10b5-1 participation. We investigate this possibility following Heckman (1979) by
estimating equation (4) with an inverse-Mills ratio constructed using the predicted probabilities from our
estimation of equation (1). Our inferences are not affected using this alternative regression specification.
5.

Conclusion
This study investigates whether disclosure can be used to enhance insiders’ strategic trade, which

is inconsistent with conventional wisdom derived from prior literature that suggests disclosure reduces
information asymmetries. This might occur because the legal rules of civil procedure can provide more
legal protection at the motion to dismiss phase of litigation when disclosure is higher, which may alter
insiders’ trading incentives.
We provide evidence that a firm’s decision to disclose 10b5-1 trading plan information is
increasing in firms’ litigation risk and in insiders’ strategic trade potential, suggesting that firms infer
legal benefits from disclosure. We also provide evidence that a firm’s decision to disclose is increasing in
the board sophistication and when institutional ownership and analyst following are higher, suggesting
that boards respond with more disclosure when they better understand the legal benefits and when there is
greater outside demand. In addition, we provide evidence that insider selling increases more and that
insiders’ sale transactions are associated with greater subsequent declines in fundamental economic and
stock returns performance for disclosed plans, which suggests that disclosure is associated with strategic
insider trading. Finally, we provide evidence that this strategic trading behavior is increasing in disclosure
specificity, suggesting that disclosure enhances insiders’ strategic trade opportunities.
Overall, these results suggest, in the 10b5-1 setting, that disclosure provides value to a “hiding in
plain sight” strategy because of its incremental legal protection. This evidence expands our understanding
of the trade-offs relating to voluntary disclosure, litigation risk, and insider trading. In addition, this
evidence potentially offers important insights to court, the SEC and other governance bodies. Because
enhanced disclosure appears associated with more strategic trade by insiders, courts might, for example,
consider more carefully whether 10b5-1 disclosure mitigates scienter.
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Appendix
Example 10b5-1 Plan Disclosures
Panel A: Specific
Excerpts from PepsiAmericas Inc. Form 8-K, Filed March 3, 2005

Panel B: Limited
Excerpt from Ariba Inc. Form 8-K, Filed June 16, 2006
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Figure 1
Average Number of Trades per Insider Following Disclosure of 10b5-1 Trading Plans: Participants

This figure plots the average number of insiders’ trades by disclosure type in the months surrounding the first
disclosure of participants’ plans between 2001 and 2006.

24

Figure 2
Average Number of Trades per Insider Following Disclosure of 10b5-1 Trading Plans:
Non-Participants

This figure plots the average number of insiders’ trades by disclosure type for insiders not participating in the 10b51 trading plans in the months surrounding the first disclosure of participants’ plans between 2001 and 2006.
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Figure 3
Cumulative Abnormal Return Relative to Sale Transactions
Panel A. Specific-disclosure sales
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Panel B. Limited-disclosure sales
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Panel C. Non-disclosure sales
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This figure plots the average cumulative abnormal return relative to insiders’ sale transactions within Rule 10b5-1.
t
Each firm’s cumulative abnormal return is computed as CARt =
(R  R
) , where Rf is the firm’s daily



d  30

f

VWCRSP d

return, RVWCRSP is the daily return to the CRSP value weighted portfolio, and t denotes a specific day relative to the
transaction date. Trade-day observations = 1,108 specific, 23,040 limited, and 20,818 non-disclosure.
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Table 1
Determinants of 10b5-1 Plan Participation Disclosure
Panel A: Summary statistics
Variable
LitRisk
Volat
InstitOwn
LnNumDirs
FinExpertDirs
InsideDirs
AnalystFollow (#)
MgmtFcst
MVE ($million)

Mean
0.015
0.027
0.526
9.159
0.624
0.364
9.291
0.460
5,007.321

Std. Dev.
0.018
0.016
0.268
3.204
0.290
0.166
9.265
0.499
23,522.18

25%
0.006
0.016
0.311
7.000
0.455
0.250
2.000
0.000
237.510

50%
0.009
0.023
0.555
9.000
0.625
0.348
7.000
0.000
679.501

75%
0.016
0.034
0.751
11.000
0.777
0.455
13.000
1.000
2,399.411

Panel B. Statistics by disclosure type
None

Lim

Spc

Spc - None

Lim - None

Spc - Lim

Mean

Mean

Mean

LitRisk

0.013

0.020

0.022

Mean
(t-stat)
0.009
(4.22)

Mean
(t-stat)
0.007
(10.67)

Mean
(t-stat)
0.002
(0.93)

Volat

0.026

0.029

0.038

0.012
(5.62)

0.003
(5.13)

0.09
(4.07)

InstitOwn

0.505

0.582

0.529

0.024
(0.64)

0.077
(7.83)

-0.053
(-1.44)

LnNumDirs

9.387

8.581

8.164

-1.223
(-2.66)

-0.806
(-6.85)

-0.417
(-0.95)

Variable
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FinExpertDirs

0.600

0.689

0.654

0.054
(1.82)

0.089
(11.03)

-0.018
(-1.14)

InsideDirs

0.366

0.354

0.372

0.012
(0.54)

-0.012
(-1.91)

0.024
(1.03)

AnalystFollow (#)

8.929

10.251

10.073

1.144
(0.90)

1.322
(3.87)

-0.179
(-0.14)

MgmtFcst

0.422

0.562

0.564

0.142
(2.10)

0.140
(7.64)

0.002
(0.03)

1,703.048

-3,787.112
(-1.06)

-1,639.521
(-1.89)

-2,147.591
(-0.68)

MVE ($million)

5,490.160

3,850.639

This table provides summary statistics (Panel A) and univariate comparisons (Panel B) of the determinants of firms’ decisions to disclose participation in 10b5-1
plans. Comparisons are made in the year of first disclosure for disclosing firms and in the first year of inferred 10b5-1 trade for non-disclosing firms. LitRisk is
the firm’s expected class action litigation probability estimated in the year prior to 10b5-1 participation disclosure; Volat is the standard deviation of residuals
from a regression of daily firm returns on daily value-weighted CRSP portfolio returns in the year prior to disclosure (CRSP); InstitOwn is the percentage of
institutional firm ownership (CDA/Spectrum) in the year prior to disclosure; NumDirs is the number of directors on the board in the year prior to disclosure
(Equilar and hand collected); FinExpertDirs is the ratio of financial experts to total board directors in the year prior to disclosure (Corporate Library); InsideDirs
is the ratio of officer directors to total board directors in the year prior to disclosure (Equilar); AnalystFollow is the number of unique analysts providing forecasts
for the firm measured in the year prior to disclosure (I/B/E/S); MgmtFcst is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the management issued at least one revenue or
earnings forecast during the period and equals zero otherwise (First Call); and MVE is the market value of equity in the year prior to disclosure (Compustat).
LitRisk is estimated from the following annual cross-sectional logistic regression [similar to Rogers and Stocken (2005)]: Pr (DMGPd = 1) = g0 + g1 MinReturn +
g2 SkewReturn + g3 StdDevRet + g4 Turnover + g5 Log(MVE) + g6 BHReturn + g7 Beta + g8 BiotechInd + g9 CompHWInd + g10 CompSWInd + g11 ElecInd + g12
RetailInd + e, where DMGPd equals one if the fiscal year falls within an alleged class action damage period (data provided by Woodruff Sawyer and Co.) and
equals zero otherwise; MinReturn is the minimum single day firm return during the fiscal year; SkewReturn is the skewness of daily returns during the fiscal year;
StdDevRet is the standard deviation of residuals from a regression of daily firm returns on daily value-weighted CRSP portfolio returns; Turnover is the average
daily trade volume scaled by shares outstanding during the fiscal year; MVE is the average market value of equity during the fiscal year; BHReturn is the prior
fiscal year’s buy and hold return; Beta is the firm’s beta coefficient from a regression of daily firm returns on daily market returns; and BiotechInd, CompHWInd,
CompSWInd, ElecInd, and RetailInd are dichotomous variables that equal one if the firm represents the biotechnology, computer hardware, computer software,
electric, or retail industries, and equal zero otherwise.
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Table 2
Determinants of 10b5-1 Plan Participation Disclosure

Logit Regression

Ordered Logit Regression

Pr(Discl = 1)

Pr(Discl = 1, 2)
Marg.
Effect
Coeff.
Lim
(z-stat) (z-stat)

Marg.
Effect
Spc
(z-stat)

Exp.
Sign

Coeff.
(z-stat)

Marg.
Effect
(z-stat)

LitRisk

+

6.498
(2.34)

1.006
(2.34)

5.152
(1.94)

0.739
(1.94)

0.070
(1.89)

Volat

+

24.661
(5.84)

3.817
(5.92)

25.501
(6.74)

3.656
(6.27)

0.346
(4.85)

InstitOwn

+

0.735
(3.27)

0.114
(3.28)

0.707
(3.23)

0.101
(3.24)

0.010
(2.99)

+/-

-0.157
(-0.76)

-0.024
(-0.76)

-0.151
(-0.74)

-0.022
(-0.74)

-0.002
(-0.74)

FinExpertDirs

+

0.543
(2.48)

0.084
(2.49)

0.517
(2.41)

0.074
(2.42)

0.007
(2.30)

InsideDirs

-

0.175
(0.62)

0.027
(0.62)

0.195
(0.71)

0.028
(0.48)

0.003
(0.71)

LnAnalystFollow

+

0.275
(4.24)

0.043
(4.27)

0.268
(4.22)

0.038
(4.25)

0.004
(3.72)

MgmtFcst

+

0.145
(1.54)

0.022
(1.54)

0.140
(1.51)

0.020
(1.51)

0.002
(1.49)

LnMVE

+

0.014
(0.32)

0.002
(0.32)

0.019
(0.46)

0.003
(0.46)

0.000
(0.46)

-

-

3.898
(2.55)

-

-

-

-

7.561
(6.185)

-

-

LnNumDirs

Cut 1

Cut 2

Fixed Effects
Num obs None
Num obs Lim

Ind, Year
2,760
995
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Ind, Year
2,760
995

Num obs Spc
Pseudo R2

55
0.194

55
0.170

This table provides logistic and ordered regressions of the determinants of firms’ decisions to disclose
participation in 10b5-1 plans. Comparisons are made in the year of first disclosure for disclosing firms and in
the first year of inferred 10b5-1 trade for non-disclosing firms. Results are based on estimating: Pr (Discl = 1
or 1, 2) =a0 + a1 LitRisk + a2 Volat + a3 InstitOwn +a4 LnNumDirs +a5 FinExpertDirs +a6 InsideDirs + a7
LnAnalystFollow + a8 MgmtFcst + a9 LnMVE +e, where Discl is a dichotomous variable that equals one if
the firm discloses Rule 10b5-1 participation details (or one if the firm discloses limited plan details and two if
the firm discloses specific plan details), and zero otherwise; LitRisk is the firm’s expected class action
litigation probability estimated in the year prior to 10b5-1 participation disclosure; Volat is the standard
deviation of residuals from a regression of daily firm returns on daily value-weighted CRSP portfolio returns
in the year prior to disclosure (CRSP); InstitOwn is the percentage of institutional firm ownership
(CDA/Spectrum) in the year prior to disclosure; NumDirs is the number of directors on the board in the year
prior to disclosure (Equilar and hand collected); FinExpertDirs is the ratio of financial experts to total board
directors in the year prior to disclosure (Corporate Library); InsideDirs is the ratio of officer directors to total
board directors in the year prior to disclosure (Equilar); AnalystFollow is the number of unique analysts
providing forecasts for the firm measured in the year prior to disclosure (I/B/E/S); MgmtFcst is a
dichotomous variable equal to one if the management issued at least one revenue or earnings forecast during
the period and equals zero otherwise (First Call); and MVE is the market value of equity in the year prior to
disclosure (Compustat). LitRisk is estimated from the following annual cross-sectional logistic regression
[similar to Rogers and Stocken (2005)]: Pr (DMGPd = 1) = g0 + g1 MinReturn + g2 SkewReturn + g3
StdDevRet + g4 Turnover + g5 Log(MVE) + g6 BHReturn + g7 Beta + g8 BiotechInd + g9 CompHWInd + g10
CompSWInd + g11 ElecInd + g12 RetailInd + e, where DMGPd equals one if the fiscal year falls within an
alleged class action damage period (data provided by Woodruff Sawyer and Co.) and equals zero otherwise;
MinReturn is the minimum single day firm return during the fiscal year; SkewReturn is the skewness of daily
returns during the fiscal year; StdDevRet is the standard deviation of residuals from a regression of daily firm
returns on daily value-weighted CRSP portfolio returns; Turnover is the average daily trade volume scaled by
shares outstanding during the fiscal year; MVE is the average market value of equity during the fiscal year;
BHReturn is the prior fiscal year’s buy and hold return; Beta is the firm’s beta coefficient from a regression of
daily firm returns on daily market returns; and BiotechInd, CompHWInd, CompSWInd, ElecInd, and RetailInd
are dichotomous variables that equal one if the firm represents the biotechnology, computer hardware,
computer software, electric, or retail industries, and equal zero otherwise. The variables LnNumDirs and
LnAnalystFollow as constructed as the natural log of one plus the number of directors and analysts following
the firm, respectively. Column 1 presents logistic regression results with fixed industry and year effects.
Column 2 presents ordered logistic regression results with fixed industry and year effects..
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Table 3
Average Number of Trades per Insider by Disclosure Type:
Participants and Non-Participants
0 to 3 months

0 to 6 month

0 to 12 months

NumTrades

Lim_Partic

Exp.
Sign
+

Marg. Effect
(z-stat)
0.323
(6.69)

Marg. Effect
(z-stat)
0.786
(9.63)

Marg. Effect
(z-stat)
1.617
(12.02)

Spc_Partic

+

0.849
(3.67)

1.683
(4.70)

2.933
(5.76)

Lim_NonPartic

-

-1.698
(-50.23)

-2.184
(-36.30)

-2.537
(-24.84)

Spc_NonPartic

-

-1.143
(-2.88)

-1.186
(-2.02)

-0.914
(-1.03)

Spc_Partic – Lim_Partic

+

0.526
(2.30)

0.898
(2.55)

1.315
(2.66)

Lim_NonPartic – Lim_Partic

-

-2.021
(-41.64)

-2.970
(-40.21)

-4.154
(-37.43)

Spc_NonPartic – Spc_Partic

-

-1.992
(-5.10)

-2.870
(-4.79)

-3.846
(-4.43)

Coefficient Comparisons

Num obs None
Num obs Lim_Partic
Num obs Spc_Partic
Num obs Lim_NonPartic
Num obs Spc_NonPartic
Wald c2 (4)

6,615
3,489
65
17,139
339
1,077.98

6,615
3,489
65
17,139
339
1,129.81

6,615
3,489
65
17,139
339
1,208.14

This table provides negative binomial regressions of the number of trades by type of 10b5-1 trading plan
disclosure following the first observed disclosure between 2001 and 2006. Comparisons are made in the
year of first disclosure for disclosing firms and in the first year of inferred 10b5-1 trade for non-disclosing
firms. None designates observations from the inferred-non disclosure sample, and is captured by the
intercept (not reported). Lim designates observations from the limited disclosure sample. Spc designates
observations from the specific disclosure sample. Partic designates observations that are participants in
10b5-1 trading plans. NonPartic designates observations that are not participants in 10b5-1 trading plans.
Reported z-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm.
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Table 4
Calendar Time Portfolio Returns
All Trades
Rport – Rf
1-mo
3-mo
6-mo
-0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.26) (-0.17) (-0.16)

Excluding Form 4 Trades
Rport – Rf
1-mo
3-mo
6-mo
-0.002
-0.001
-0.001
(-0.26)
(-0.14)
(-0.21)

Lim

-0.012
(-1.86)

-0.012
(-2.04)

-0.009
(-1.56)

-0.011
(-1.78)

-0.011
(-1.63)

-0.007
(-1.08)

Spc

-0.043
(-5.27)

-0.025
(-3.77)

-0.013
(-2.18)

-0.035
(-4.59)

-0.021
(-2.86)

-0.015
(-2.14)

Rm -Rf

1.242
(9.42)

1.012
(8.90)

0.990
(8.69)

1.198
(9.29)

1.044
(8.00)

1.072
(8.42)

SMB

0.859
(6.21)

0.913
(7.66)

0.854
(7.11)

0.774
(5.70)

0.839
(6.13)

0.850
(6.33)

HML

0.225
(1.33)

0.053
(0.36)

0.060
(0.41)

0.266
(1.60)

0.116
(0.68)

0.100
(0.60)

UMD

0.022
(0.20)

-0.042
(-0.44)

-0.114
(-1.19)

0.018
(0.17)

-0.099
(-0.90)

-0.156
(-1.46)

None

Coefficient Comparisons
Lim – None

-0.010
(-1.86)

-0.011
(-2.04)

-0.008
(-1.56)

-0.009
(-1.78)

-0.009
(-1.28)

-0.006
(-0.64)

Spc – None

-0.041
(-4.08)

-0.024
(-2.83)

-0.012
(-1.53)

-0.032
(-3.34)

-0.020
(-2.09)

-0.013
(-1.46)

Spc – Lim

-0.031
(-3.04)

-0.013
(-1.62)

-0.004
(-0.54)

-0.024
(-2.46)

-0.010
(-1.07)

-0.007
(-1.08)

72
71
45
0.589

72
71
52
0.609

72
71
61
0.592

72
71
52
0.539

72
71
60
0.568

None Month-Obs
Lim Month-Obs
Spc Month-Obs
Adj R2

72
71
41
0.578

This table provides results from a regression of (Rport – Rf) = 0 + 1 (Rm – Rf) + 2 SMB + 3 HML +
4 UMD + u, where Rport is the equally-weighted monthly return to a portfolio of firms selected if an
insider initiates a sales transaction within Rule 10b5-1 in the preceding 1-, 3- or 6-month period, Rf
is the one-month treasury bill rate, Rm is the equal-weighted monthly market return, and SMB, HML,
and UMD are the monthly small-minus-big, high-minus-low, and momentum factors discussed in
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). At least 3 firms must be present in each calendarmonth to form a portfolio. None designates observations from the inferred-non disclosure sample.
Lim designates observations from the limited disclosure sample. Spc designates observations from
the specific disclosure sample.
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